The Economic Impact of Small Regional Commissions: Evidence from the Delta Regional Authority by Morin, Tyler & Partridge, Mark
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
The Economic Impact of Small Regional
Commissions: Evidence from the Delta
Regional Authority
Tyler Morin and Mark Partridge
26 June 2019
Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/95200/
MPRA Paper No. 95200, posted 25 July 2019 07:16 UTC
The Economic Impact of Small Regional Commissions
Evidence from the Delta Regional Authority
Tyler Morin
morin.43@osu.edu
203-339-1066
2120 Fyffe Road Columbus, Ohio 43210
Mark Partridge
partridge.27@osu.edu
614-688-4907
336 Ag Admin Building
2120 Fyffe Road Columbus, Ohio 43210
June 26, 2019
Abstract
Factors such as falling U.S. migration rates and diverging regional economic fortunes
have heightened interest in place-based policies. Indeed, the U.S. has had many such
federal efforts including recently enacted Opportunity Zones. Historically, substantial
federal funding has gone to regional economic development programs such as the Ten-
nessee Valley Authority (TVA) and Appalachian Regional Commission (ARC). Yet,
little is known about the benefits of some of the smaller place-based programs. We
extend the literature on regional commissions by analyzing the economic gains to the
Delta Regional Authority (DRA). The DRA was founded in 2000 to provide enhanced
development aid to 252 Lower Mississippi Valley counties. Using data over the 1997
to 2016 period, we assess the DRA’s impact on employment, income, migration, and
poverty. One-to-one propensity score matching is used to generate a set of counterfac-
tual counties. Due to the endogenous nature of the treatment, we instrument for coun-
ties being included in the DRA using a dummy for whether the county is within the
Lower Mississippi Watershed. The ensuing results reflects an estimation of the intent-
to-treat benefits of the DRA. We find that the DRA is associated with income gains
and decreases in unemployment; however, no impact on poverty or migration. In sum,
the DRA produces economic benefits that greatly exceed its direct costs.
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1 Introduction
Factors such as falling U.S. migration rates, diverging regional economic fortunes, and
stagnating rural and urban centers heightened interest in place-based policies (Austin,
Glaeser, and Summers (2018), Barca, McCann, and Rodridguez (2012), and Partridge
and Rickman (2006)). Indeed, the U.S. has had many such place-based federal efforts
including recently enacted Opportunity Zones, as well as historic standbys such as
the TVA and ARC. With the perceived success of other regional commissions, the late
1990’s and early 2000’s saw the expansion of these programs across the United States.
From Alaska to the Great Plains, the federal government set up regional commissions
to provide assistance to some of the country’s poorest regions. Despite this, these eco-
nomic development efforts have recently come under fire.
President Donald Trump’s fiscal year 2018 budget proposed billions of dollars of
cuts to many federal economic development programs, including the Delta Regional
Authority (DRA) and the Appalachian Regional Commission (ARC). Even though this
proposal was never enacted by Congress, it does illustrate the continuing concern that
such place-based policies are wasteful in which the intended beneficiaries not receiving
the bulk of the benefits. Thus, the purpose of this paper is to assess the economic im-
pacts of DRA on counties under its authority.
The DRA is a small, ongoing Federal-State regional commission in the lower Mis-
sissippi River Valley. It was originally founded in 2000 with the intent of improving
the livelihood of this historically poor region across its 252 counties 1. The goals of the
DRA are to provide funding for basic public infrastructure, transportation infrastruc-
ture, business and entrepreneurship development, and workforce development or job
training.
1It is well known that the Deep South has long been among the poorest regions in the country.
For example, Mississippi’s 1929 GDP per capita income was approximately 25% of New York state’s
per capita income according the BEA. Yet, going back to when the first poverty rates were measured
in 1959, U.S. Department of Agriculture’s Economic Research Service has found that a large number
of counties have persistently had poverty rates exceeding 20% for this entire time period, with a large
share having rates above 20% for much of this time period.
2
From fiscal years 2002 to 2015, the DRA received a total of $138 million in federal
funding. They claim that this money leveraged another $752 million from other pub-
lic sources and $2.2 billion from private sources. The DRA has funded approximately
1000 different projects, mostly in the form of grants to private and public organiza-
tions. With this, the DRA claim to have created or helped retain 26,218 jobs, provided
job training for 7,202 individuals, and positively impacted 65,831 families, well above
their original projections (Masingill (2016)). However, as with all such self-assessments,
one must view these assertions with some skepticism.
Despite claims of noticeable benefits from the DRA, there has been very little
research on the economic benefits of the Delta Regional Authority and just as little
on other small regional authorities. Much of the literature focuses on the larger ARC
(Brandow, et al. (2000), Glaeser and Gottlieb (2008), and Freshwater et al. (1997)) or
the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) (Freshwater et al. (1997) and Kline and Moretti
(2014)). There are several papers examining the impact on a national scale with the
Economic Development Administration (Barrows and Bromley (1975), Martin and Gra-
ham (1980), Burchell et al. (1997), and Burchell et al. (1998)). In general, these papers
found either no impact on key economic indicators or small benefits. Perhaps the most
knwon paper in the area is Isserman and Rephann’s (1995) examination of the ARC.
They used Mahalanobis Matching to find “twins” of the treated counties. They found
significant gains in personal income, per capita income, and transfer payments in the
region due to the ARC.
This paper also extends into the literature regarding place-based policies. The
effectiveness of these targeted programs has been the center of much debate (Kline
(2010), Glaeser and Gottleib (2008), Busso, Gregory, and Kline (2013), Partridge et
al., (2013)). Most of the literature focuses on well-funded, urban programs like the Fed-
eral Empowerment Zones (Liebschutz (1995), Ham et al., (2011), Reynolds and Rohlin
(2015)). The DRA allows for a unique look into place-based policy by examining the
effectiveness of a program that is geographically large, but has relatively small fund-
ing. We ask the question as to whether such low-funded place-based efforts are worth
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the effort besides being little more than a political band-aid to a stagnate region’s vot-
ers. Indeed, such place-based efforts has the advantage of only being able to target the
projects with the highest returns. They also have some ability to broker and build net-
works with affected governments and stakeholders. However, with such a lack of fund-
ing, they may lack the resources to ”move the dial.”
There is little research on the DRA’s effectiveness. There are some papers that ex-
plore similar regions such as the Mississippi Delta (Ciscel (1999)). The main paper of
note is Pender and Reeder’s (2011) assessment of the initial effects of the the DRA,
focusing on rural counties. Using propensity score matching with nearest neighbor
matching, the authors construct a difference-in-difference estimate to the effects that
the DRA produced $15 of personal income growth for every dollar spent, which seems
rather optimistic at first consideration.
This paper attempts to extend the previous literature by examining smaller re-
gional commissions that appear to have too few resources to have tangible effects. First
is our use of instrumental variable (IV) estimation to correct for the selection bias for
the treatment. Next is our use multiple years of pretreatment data versus only a sin-
gle year to allow for a more accurate assessment of parallel trends. These techniques
should result in better estimates of the economic effects of the DRA to appraise its
overall effectiveness.
The rest of the paper is as follows. Section 2 describes the institutional features
of the DRA. Section 3 will discuss data and empirical methodology followed by section
4’s protrayal of the results. Section 5 presents robustness checks, where as Section 6
summarizes the paper’s findings and discuss future research needs.
2 Delta Regional Authority
The DRA is a federal-state commission focused on the lower Mississippi River Valley;
an area that consists of 10 million residents within 8 states across 252 counties and
parishes (Masingill (2016)). When the DRA was created in 2000 (S. 1622), it marked
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the end of a 10-year political battle to establish a regional commission in the lower
Mississippi Valley. The idea of the DRA can be traced back to 1988 when Senator Dale
Bumpers (D-AR) proposed the Lower Mississippi Delta Development Act (S. 2246).
The proposed bill offered government assistance to 212 economically distressed counties
in the Lower Mississippi Delta region. The goal was to create a similar program as the
ARC and TVA. However, his bill failed to pass committee. In 1999, the Delta Regional
Authority Act was again proposed. The bill was similar to Bumpers’, but its the area
was increased to cover 240 counties and parishes and include counties from outside the
Delta in Alabama. This expansion was likely done to make it more politically attrac-
tive with a larger constituency. President Bill Clinton announced DRA funding in early
2000. Its first programs began operations in 2002. In 2008, the DRA added 10 parishes
from Louisiana and two counties in Mississippi, bringing the total counties and parishes
to 252. The DRA promotes economic development through various outreach programs.
One of its more prominent projects is expanding access to quality healthcare. The
DRA’s Delta Doctors program allows foreign physicians trained in the United States to
work in medically underserved communities for three years utilizing a J-1 Visa waiver.
This create an opportunity for these doctors to work in these remote areas while serv-
ing DRA constituents who have little to no access to primary or emergency healthcare.
Another DRA initiative is the Community Health Systems Development Program, a
collaboration with Health Resources and Human Services and the U.S. Department of
Health and Human Services. This program attempts to improve the infrastructure of
the local hospitals, clinics, and other healthcare organizations via a technical assistance
program. This includes implementing improvements to financial operations, telehealth
operations, and providing social services to address challenges faced by patients like
child care, housing etc.
One of the DRA’s key objectives is improving the local workforce through job
training programs across the region. The Re-Imagining Workforce Development pro-
gram aids communities in planing and building regional development workforce sys-
tems. State-run summits strive to bring together leadership, business, and educators to
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best address the changing needs of the economy and to fill the gaps in the training. In
addition, the DRA runs the Delta Entrepreneurship Network to bring together small
business owners to discuss, inform, and provide access to the resources needed to make
small businesses thrive and to encourage their start-ups. Regarding such programs
to enhance entreprenuership, they may have especially high local economic payoffs as
found by Stephens and Partridge (2011) and Stephens et al. (2013).
Through the Delta Leadership Institute, the DRA links community and govern-
ment leaders to address the area’s direst issues. In bringing stakeholders together, the
DRA can improve collaboration. The Delta Leadership Institute’s Executive Academy
provides training, information, and networking to facilitate bringing larger groups to
address broader issues. Indeed, regional organizations such as the DRA can play a
larger role as a broker that brings together the relevant players in one room. This gar-
ners a critical mass to address larger regional issues that one entity could not address
alone. Similarly, the DRA can provide capacity to help identify funding sources and
grant writing, as well as providing small matching funding to help achieve cost-sharing
thresholds for grant applications.
Another set of programs come in the form of direct funding. In its Regional Devel-
opment Plan III (Masingill et. al, (2016)), the DRA defined three project goals eligible
for their direct funding: 1) “advance the productivity and economic competitiveness
of the Delta workforce, 2) strengthen the Delta’s physical, digital, and capital connec-
tions to the global economy, and 3) facilitate local capacity building within Delta com-
munities, organizations, businesses, and individuals.” The funding normally comes in
the form of grants to any initiative that attempts to address one of these goals and the
DRA can occasionally be the funding source of last resort.
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3 Methodology
3.1 Instrumental Variable (2SLS)
The DRA’s geography, unfortunately, creates a selectivity issue for studying its effects
because its counties were not randomly assigned. Rather there was an arbitrary cutoff
for the program that was decided either due to the areas being sufficiently economically
distressed or more due to political motives. Either way, it creates a potential endogene-
ity problem that requires the use of an instrumental variable to addres treatment selec-
tivity.
Our instrument is an indicator variable for belonging to the Lower Mississippi Wa-
tershed. The watershed is a purely geographical designation defined by the U.S. Geo-
logical Society (USGS). A watershed is defined as “The divide separating one drainage
basin from another and in the past has been generally used to convey this meaning....
Drainage divide, or just divide, is used to denote the boundary between one drainage
area and another.” (Langvein and Iseri (1995)). In this case, it is the water that flows
or drains into the lower Mississippi River. Figure 1 provides a visualization of the in-
strument. On the left is a map of the counties of the DRA (Masingill (2016)). On the
right is a map of the Lower Mississippi Watershed (Ierardi (2016)).
The strucutre of the instrument creates an issue for the difference in difference
(DiD) estimate. The DiD estimator will be biased and inconsistent if it is created us-
ing one endogenous and one exogenous variable. Falling in line with Bun and Harrison
(2014), we use another instrument using the interaction of the post treatment and wa-
tershed counties. Bun and Harrison (2014) show that this type of interaction, under
standard IV assumptions, creates a consistent and asymptotically normal estimate such
that conventional IV inference can be used.
This designation should be purely exogenous to any economic variables because
the watershed’s boundaries are effectively random to any individual county. They do
not determine any state or county boundary, and have no economic effects by them-
selves, or at least conditional on the economic variables we control for such as agri-
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Figure 1: DRA and Watershed
cultural intensity. Yet, due to the intent of the DRA, it should be highly predictive
of treatment. The DRA is focused on the historically poorest counties near the lower
Mississippi River delta.
However, the instrument may have concerns relating to how well it meets the ex-
clusion restriction. The Lower Mississippi Watershed may have unique factors that will
impact its economic outcomes. These can include soil quality, climate, etc. While we
do not directly control for these things, the propensity score matched counties still
should have similar characteristics. By choosing counties that control demographic,
economic, and employment characteristics, it should control for any of these factors.
Since both the matched and treated counties have similar characteristics, the watershed
should not have unique benefits, meaning the instruments meet the exclusion restric-
tion. In addition, as noted above, our restriction should be exogenous conditional on
controlling for many of the variables that are features of the Delta including economic
composition and demographics.
The instrument has the potential to act in one of two ways depending on how ad-
ditional selection and exclusion was done. First, if counties are added or removed due
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Table 1: Propensity Score Variables
Variable Years Variable Years
Economic Variables
% in Poverty 1997-2001 % of Children in Poverty 1997-2001
% Working for Federal Government 1997-2001 % Working for State Government 1997-2001
% Working for Local Government 1997-2001 % Working in Goods-Producing 1997-2001
% Working in Manufacturing 1997-2001 % Working in Natural Resources & Mining 1997-2001
% Working in Construction 1997-2001 % Working in Service-Providing 1997-2001
% Working in Trade, Transportation, & Utilities 1997-2001 % Working in Information 1997-2001
% Working in Professional & Business Services 1997-2001 % Working in Education & Health Services 1997-2001
% Working in Lesiure & Hospitality 1997-2001 % Working in Other 1997-2001
Wage Growth 1996-2001 % Working in Unclassified 1997-2001
ln(Median Income) 1997-2001 Education 2000
Demographic Variables
% Male and White 1997-2001 % Female and White 1997-2001
% Male and Black 1997-2001 % Female and Black 1997-2001
% Male and Asian and Pacific Islander 1997-2001 % Female and Asian and Pacific Islander 1997-2001
% Male and Native American 1997-2001 % Female and Native American 1997-2001
Population Growth 1996-2001 Rural-Urban Continuum Codes 2003
% Net Migration 2000-2001
to political reasons rather than poor local economies, it is likely that the 2SLS esti-
mates of the DRA estimates would increase if these counties have healthier economies.
However, if additional non-Delta counties were added based on need, using IV would
decrease the point DRA estimated effects because it is of these ”weaker” counties would
bring down the average DRA effect.
3.2 Propensity Score Matching
In policy evaluation, a key challenge is finding a proper counterfactual. Rarely are gov-
ernment programs implemented using random selection with treated and control groups
(i.e. Progresa in Mexico. Behrman and Hoddinott (2005) and Schultz (2003)), forcing
this leads researchers to create their own counterfactual. For example, in Ham et al.
(2011), they used nearby census tracts when looking at the effect of Federal Empow-
erment Zones. This creates a problem of possible spillovers biasing the results. Other
common methodologies include propensity score matching (Rosenbaum and Rubin
(1983)) and synthetic controls (Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003) and Abadie, Diamond,
and Hainmueller (2010)).
The concept of propensity scores has been in existence for decades (Rosenbaum
and Rubin (1983, 1984), Hirano, Imbens, and Ridder (2003), etc.). The idea is to find
untreated regions that closely match the observational characteristics of the treated
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regions. This allows for observation of regions that were similar prior to treatment to
help form a credible counterfactual.
Program evaluation of this type used in this study was pioneered by Isserman and
Rephann’s (1995) evaluation of the ARC. They used a similar methodology called Ma-
halanobis Matching by considering counties that had similar demographics and eco-
nomic characteristics to those included in the ARC. They then used mean testing to
see how the ARC counties performed relative to their “twins”.
In this paper, we use a one-to-one propensity score matching with replacement to
find counterfactual counties for those not included in the DRA. Weighting the matches
on their frequency should mitigate any biases the smaller sample size may present. The
matching algorithm is provided by the “PSMATCH2” user code for Stata (Leuven and
Sianesi (2001)) by using a standard binary probit model to generate estimated propen-
sity scores. Many of the control variables are similar to those in Isserman and Rephann
(1995). For a full list of the variables, see Table 1.
We also employ multiple pretreatment years to better establish pretreatment trends,
rather than one year of pretreatment data, to help the matching algorithm find a bet-
ter match. For instance, Pender and Reeder (2011) use data from 2000 as the basis for
their propensity score which may be insufficient to guarantee a parallel trend for their
difference-in-difference estimator. Appendix 1 provides graphical evidence regarding
parallel trends for key economic indicators used in this study.
3.3 Econometric structure
Our base model is the difference-in-difference (DiD) estimation that is commonly used
in policy evaluation (Baum-Snow and Ferreria (2014)):
Yit = β0 + β1Treatit + β2Postit + β3Treatit ∗ Postit + ωXit + λi + τt + it (1)
where Yit represents outcome variables for count i in year t. The main outcomes we
consider are median household income and poverty rates. Treatit is an indicator vari-
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able for whether county i is included in the DRA. The comparison group for treatment
will be the matched counties. Postit represents years starting with when the DRA be-
came operational in 2002. Though the DRA was passed into law in 2000 (Masingill
(2016)), the tangible impacts should come from funding. Given that funding levels were
relatively small, we doubt there were any measuable anticipation effects; nevertheless,
we will test earlier years for the Postit year in robustness checks. β3 is the DiD coeffi-
cient. Xit is a matrix of control covariates. λi are state fixed effects. τt are year fixed
effects.
We will also employ instrumental variable (IV) estimation to acount for selectiv-
ity endogeneity. As noted above, our instrument is an indicator for whether the is in
county the Lower Mississippi Watershed. The two first stage equations are as follows:
Treati = α0 + α1Watershedi + α2Xit + λi + τt + µit (2)
Treati∗Postit = γ0+γ1Watershedi+γ2Postit+γ3Watershedi∗Postit+γ4Xit+λi+τt+vit
(3)
The results of the first stage equations are reported in Table 1 in Section 3.1. Equa-
tion 2 describes the first stage equation for the Treat variable using Watershed as
the instrument and the other control variables defined above. Equation 3 follows the
structure recommended by Bun and Harrison (2014) for Treati ∗ Postit variable us-
ing as instruments (Watershedi), the exogenous variable (Postit), the interaction of
Watershedi and Postit, and the control variables.
3.4 Data
The base data is a 1997 to 2016 panel dataset of U.S. counties.
The demographic data is from different Census Databases. Median houshold in-
come and poverty estimates are from the Census Small Area Income and Poverty Es-
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timates (SAIPE) database.2 Population, net migration, and county demographics are
from the Census County Population by Characteristics Database. Net migration data
is only available beginning in 2000 instead of 1997. Additionally, nonemployer statistics
are gathered from annual estimates provided by the Census Bureau.
Information on employment, wages, and unemployment are from the Bureau of
Labor Statistics (BLS). Employment and wages by industry and wages are from the
Quarterly Census of Employment and Wages. The county unemployment rates are
from the monthly Local Area Unemployment estimates averaged over the entire year.
Geographic information are from a number of different sources. The DRA counties
are from the DRA Year in Review (Masingill (2016)) and ARC are added from their
website (“Counties in Appalachia”). TVA, unlike the ARC and DRA, does not have to
cover entire counties. As a result, the data for the counties are taken from Kline and
Moretti (2014). Shapefiles for the Lower Mississippi Watershed are provided by the
USGS (Ierardi (2016)).
The watershed intrument was generated by overlaying county shapefiles on the
watershed shapefile in ArcGIS. The counties were defined as being in the watershed if
any part of the county was in the watershed. Therefore, if no part of the county is in
the watershed, it is counted as being outside the watershed.
We omit some counties from the analysis. First, counties from Alaska and Hawaii
are dropped due to their extreme remoteness. Next, independent cities are omitted be-
cause there are no independent cities within the DRA. Seven parishes from Louisiana
are omitted because Hurricane Katrina meant that monthly measurements were not
collected from September 2005 to June 2006, making it impossible to create annual av-
erages for those two years. We further omit all ARC counties because, while the ARC
counties might have many observable similarities to DRA counties, the ARC is con-
siderably better funded and has been in existence for nearly 40 years longer than the
2One concern is that the SAIPE values are measured with measurement error. However, bear
in mind that we use these variables as dependent variables, meaning that the regression coefficients
should remain unbiased though the coefficient standard errors will be inflated.
12
Table 2: Summary Statistics Before Treatment
DRA
Counties
PSM
Counties
Other US
Counties
Difference
in Levels
Difference
in Growth Rate
Median HH Income 27757.3 29286.7 35824.7 ***
(5216.5) (4928.7) (8784.6)
% in Poverty 0.198 0.181 0.132 ***
(0.0587) (0.0694) (0.0559)
% Children in Poverty 0.254 0.235 0.171 ***
(0.0722) (0.0854) (0.0781)
Unemployment Rate 0.0684 0.0686 0.0467 ***
(0.0249) (0.0450) (0.0239)
Nonemployer 1735.2 2025.461 5807.16
(3525.095) (2206.594) (20289.1)
% Net Migration -0.00325 -0.000275 -0.000565 *** ***
(0.00835) (0.00733) (0.0114)
Number of Counties 236 33 2407
Statistical tests run on DRA counties against the matches.
∗∗∗ p<0.01, ∗∗ p<0.05, ∗ p<0.1
DRA. ARC counties will be included in robustness checks. Finally, the counties that
are part of both the ARC and the DRA have been dropped.
Table 2 shows the summary statistics for pretreatment data between the different
groups in this study. The first group is the ”treated” DRA counties containing all DRA
counties except those that were omitted as perviously discussed. The Propensity Score
Matched (PSM) counties appear to create a reasonable counterfactual. The matched
counties are fairly close in income, poverty, and unemployment measures in terms of
the matched counties are not statistically different from the DRA counties, while the
rest of the country’s corresponding variables are statistically different from the DRA
counties. This illustrates that the matched counties are a much better counterfactual
than the rest of the U.S. Appendix 1 shows the pre- and post-treatment trends for the
dependent variables and illustrates that the treatment and control counties have paral-
lel trends.
4 Results
Turning to the regression results, we first discuss the first-stage results and then the
second-stage IV results.
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Table 3: First Stage Results
(1) (2)
Treat Treat*Post
Watershed 0.409∗∗∗ 0.108∗∗∗
(0.0106) (0.0161)
Post 0.292∗∗∗
(0.0155)
Watershed * Post 0.294∗∗∗
(0.0182)
Observations 9440 9440
R2 0.392 0.491
F 144.2 206.1
∗∗∗ p<0.01, ∗∗ p<0.05, ∗ p<0.1
Standard errors are in parentheses.
Demographic controls include variables for employment industry, race, and gender.
4.1 First Stage Results
Table 3 reports the first stage results for the two different specifications of the instru-
ment. Recall Watershed is a dummy variable that denotes whether a county is within
the Lower Mississippi Watershed. Post is a dummy if the year of the panel is before or
after the DRA begins its funding programs, which is 2002 or there after. Watershed ∗
Post is the interaction following Bun and Harrison’s (2014) correction. Treat is a dummy
for any DRA county. Column 1 depicts the first-stage for just the treatment, in which
the F-statistic value for the strength of the instrument being 144. Column 2 reports
the first-stage results for the interaction instrument. In this case, the F-statistic regard-
ing the strength of the instrument equals 206. In both cases, the first-stage results indi-
cate a strong instrument for the second-stage.
4.2 Income
We first consider average county median household income as a welfare measure of the
middle class by providing multiple OLS and IV models to show robustness. Our pre-
ferred results are in columns 3 and 7 that include both year and state fixed effects and
columns 4 and 8 that replace state fixed effects with county fixed effects. The trade-
offs are that the county fixed effect models are economically ”stronger” as they re-
move county-specific time-invariant omitted effects, not just state omitted effects. How-
ever, this comes at the costs of removing all persistent cross-sectional effects, including
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Table 4: Median Household Income
OLS 2SLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Treatment -0.0531∗∗∗ -0.0344∗∗∗ -0.0367∗∗∗ 0.0645∗∗ 0.0420∗ 0.0304 0.418∗∗∗
(0.00500) (0.00397) (0.00397) (0.0270) (0.0227) (0.0193) (0.0247)
Post 2002 0.106∗∗∗ 0.380∗∗∗ 0.383∗∗∗ 0.375∗∗∗ 0.137∗∗∗ 0.377∗∗∗ 0.374∗∗∗ 0.370∗∗∗
(0.00450) (0.00712) (0.00697) (0.00418) (0.0162) (0.0161) (0.0144) (0.00600)
Treat*Post 0.0308∗∗∗ 0.0228∗∗∗ 0.0258∗∗∗ 0.00923∗∗∗ -0.0195 0.0650∗∗ 0.0818∗∗∗ 0.0170∗∗
(0.00566) (0.00448) (0.00430) (0.00190) (0.0315) (0.0263) (0.0229) (0.00720)
Observations 9440 9440 9440 9440 9440 9440 9440 9440
R2 0.656 0.785 0.805 0.919 0.621 0.726 0.759 0.967
Demographic Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes
State Fixed Effects No No Yes No No Yes
County Fixed Effects No No No Yes No No No Yes
∗∗∗ p<0.01, ∗∗ p<0.05, ∗ p<0.1
Standard errors are in parentheses.
Demographic controls include variables for employment industry, race, and gender.
those of the DRA, because such effects are picked up by the county fixed effects. This
would suggest that the models with the state fixed effects may be more valid. Table 3
shows that the DRA had a (nominal) average median household income of $27,757 in
2000 while the rest of the country’s average median household income was considerably
higher at $35,824, or 29.1% above the DRA.
Using the natural log of the county’s median household income as the dependent
variable, Table 4 presents the regression results. The first four columns report the OLS
estimates followed by the 2SLS estimates in columns 5 to 8.
With only demographic controls in column 1, the OLS regression results suggest
that DRA counties are negatively selected with approximately 5.31% lower average me-
dian household income prior to the DRA’s operation than the matched results (or in
actuality .0531 log points). Regarding the DRA’s influence, the results indicate that
the average treatment effect of the DRA on average county median household income
is approximately a statistically significant 3.08% increase. Column 2 adds year fixed
effects, which reduces the DRA’s influence to approximately 2.28%. After including
state and year fixed effects in column 3, the DRA’s average treatment effect increases
to approcimately 2.58% compared to matched counties. For comparison, using the
mean values from Table 2, the estiamted postive effects equals $716 in 2000 dollars
or $1,051.38 in 2018 dollars after adjusting by the Consumer Price Index (CPI). The
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Table 5: Percent of People in Poverty
OLS 2SLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Treatment 0.00852∗∗∗ 0.00933∗∗∗ 0.00920∗∗∗ 0.00704 0.0105 -0.00248 -0.250∗∗∗
(0.00137) (0.00129) (0.00126) (0.00719) (0.00662) (0.00563) (0.0113)
Post 2002 0.0110∗∗∗ 0.00104 0.00387∗ 0.0193∗∗∗ 0.0174∗∗∗ 0.00686 0.00338 0.00588∗∗
(0.00123) (0.00231) (0.00221) (0.00185) (0.00431) (0.00468) (0.00419) (0.00275)
Treat*Post -0.00653∗∗∗ -0.00610∗∗∗ -0.00734∗∗∗ -0.00414∗∗∗ -0.0214∗∗ -0.0206∗∗∗ -0.0120∗ 0.0175∗∗∗
(0.00155) (0.00145) (0.00136) (0.000840) (0.00837) (0.00766) (0.00667) (0.00330)
Observations 9440 9440 9440 9440 9440 9440 9440 9440
R2 0.654 0.691 0.735 0.630 0.654 0.690 0.732 0.928
Demographic Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes
State Fixed Effects No No Yes No No No Yes No
County Fixed Effects No No No Yes No No No Yes
∗∗∗ p<0.01, ∗∗ p<0.05, ∗ p<0.1
Standard errors are in parentheses.
Demographic controls include variables for employment industry, race, and gender.
DRA has spent about $13.90 per person in direct spending over the program’s lifetime
or $350 per person when including leveraged money, suggesting that DRA expenditures
have remarkable returns.
The 2SLS estimates likely provide the better estimates given the endogenous se-
lection. Jumping to column 7 when state and year fixed effects are included, the esti-
mated DRA treatment is now a considerably larger 8.18% and statistically significant.
Even when controlling for county fixed effects in column 8, there is still a positive and
statistically significant treatment effect of 1.70%. What this further indicates is that
the DRA negatively selected counties in that they were more slowly growing than one
would otherwise expect.
4.3 Poverty
Poverty is clearly one of biggest challenges facing DRA counties. Despite strong na-
tional economic growth during the latter-half of the 1990s for most of the country, the
DRA region’s total poverty rate was about 50% greater than the national average. In
addition, the DRA child poverty rate was also considerably higher (25.4% compared to
17.1%).
Keeping with the structure of Table 4, Table 5 reports the DiD results for the to-
tal poverty rate. With only demographic controls in column 1, the OLS results suggest
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that the DRA is associateed with a statistically significant decrease in the poverty rate
of .653 percentage points, which seems to be similar to the results in column 2 when
adding the year fixed effects. When controlling for year and state fixed effects, the
poverty reducing effect rises to .734 percentage points. As before, the 2SLS results sug-
gest that the DRA are negatively selected with larger poverty rate reductions that the
corresponding OLS results (columns 1-3 versus columns 5-7). Focusing on when state
and year fixed effects are included (column 7), the 2SLS shows that the DRA was asso-
ciated with a statistically significant 1.2 percentage point lower poverty rate(though
at the 10% level). The effect changes to an increase in poverty when controlling for
county fixed effects. Though the effect is statistically significant, it is likely due to the
decreased variation from removing all persistent cross-sectional effects.
Table 6 shows the results for the child poverty rate. When including all controls in
column 3, there seems to be again a small significant decrease in child poverty. The
point estimate is about -0.76 percentage points that is statistically significant. The
2SLS estimates again suggest that the DRA counties are negatively selected with rel-
ative stable point estimates that are negative and greater in magnitude than the the
OLS. However, only the results without year and state fixed effects (column 5) and
with year and county fixed effects (column 8) are statistically significant. These es-
timates show the DRA program is associated with about 2 percentage points lower
county child poverty rates. These results show that the DRA has mixed impacts on
total and child poverty, though most of the estimates suggest that it has a negative
effects. It should be noted that the results are not as precisely estimated as the the me-
dian household income results, but in general, suggest postive effects for the DRA.
4.4 Unemployment
One of the important goals of the DRA was to promote employment opportunities. To
apparise this, we first consider county unemployment rates. Pretreatment, the average
2000 DRA county unemployment rate was 46.5% higher compared to the rest of the
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Table 6: Percent of Children in Poverty
OLS 2SLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Treatment 0.0115∗∗∗ 0.0133∗∗∗ 0.0116∗∗∗ -0.0129 -0.00981 -0.0191∗∗ -0.337∗∗∗
(0.00197) (0.00185) (0.00179) (0.0108) (0.00987) (0.00827) (0.0164)
Post 2002 0.0179∗∗∗ 0.0194∗∗∗ 0.0258∗∗∗ 0.0468∗∗∗ 0.0228∗∗∗ 0.0198∗∗∗ 0.0226∗∗∗ 0.0308∗∗∗
(0.00178) (0.00332) (0.00314) (0.00271) (0.00647) (0.00698) (0.00616) (0.00398)
Treat*Post -0.00627∗∗∗ -0.00617∗∗∗ -0.00756∗∗∗ -0.00547∗∗∗ -0.0218∗ -0.0180 -0.0148 0.0204∗∗∗
(0.00223) (0.00208) (0.00193) (0.00123) (0.0126) (0.0114) (0.00981) (0.00479)
Observations 9440 9440 9440 9440 9440 9440 9440 9440
R2 0.627 0.671 0.715 0.633 0.622 0.666 0.701 0.905
Demographic Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes
State Fixed Effects No No Yes No No No Yes No
County Fixed Effects No No No Yes No No No Yes
∗∗∗ p<0.01, ∗∗ p<0.05, ∗ p<0.1
Standard errors are in parentheses.
Demographic controls include variables for employment industry, race, and gender.
country, or the corresponding 2000 unemployment rate levels are 6.84% in the DRA
compared to 4.67% in the rest of the country.
The unemployment rate results are shown in Table 7. Unemployment rates ap-
pears to decline more in the treated DRA counties relative to their matched counties,
though again in the OLS estimates, the results are not precisely estimated. With the
state and year fixed effects (column 3), the DRA is associated with about a statisti-
cally significant 0.14 percentage point lower unemployment rate. The 2SLS estimates
continue to tell a negative selectivity story with negative estimates in the negative one
percentage point range. When examining the model with state and year fixed effects
(column 7), the unemployment rate in the DRA counties appears to be about 1.25 per-
centage points lower compared to the matched counties. The effect with county and
year fixed effects (column 8) shows similar results, though the magnitude of the effect
is reduced by about half.
The decrease in the unemployment rate actually falls in line with many of the as-
sertions the DRA makes. The DRA has claimed over its existence that it has helped
create or helped retained 26,218 jobs (Masingill (2016)). While self-reported evalu-
ations should always be treated skeptically, the evidence is consistent with the DRA
improving the local labor market. Consequently, if at least the direction of the DRA’s
self-reported estimate is accurate, this change in unemployment is expected.
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Table 7: Unemployment Rate
OLS 2SLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Treatment 0.00216∗∗ 0.00378∗∗∗ 0.00255∗∗∗ 0.00942∗∗ 0.00722∗∗ 0.0106∗∗∗ -0.0714∗∗∗
(0.000893) (0.000675) (0.000656) (0.00466) (0.00349) (0.00291) (0.00756)
Post 2002 0.0101∗∗∗ -0.00942∗∗∗ -0.00802∗∗∗ -0.0118∗∗∗ 0.0170∗∗∗ -0.00466∗ -0.00219 -0.00874∗∗∗
(0.000803) (0.00121) (0.00115) (0.00128) (0.00280) (0.00247) (0.00216) (0.00184)
Treat*Post -0.000976 -0.00111 -0.00140∗∗ -0.000763 -0.0155∗∗∗ -0.0118∗∗∗ -0.0125∗∗∗ -0.00571∗∗∗
(0.00101) (0.000762) (0.000710) (0.000580) (0.00543) (0.00403) (0.00345) (0.00221)
Observations 9440 9440 9440 9440 9440 9440 9440 9440
R2 0.407 0.652 0.688 0.684 0.406 0.649 0.684 0.825
Demographic Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes
State Fixed Effects No No Yes No No No Yes No
County Fixed Effects No No No Yes No No No Yes
∗∗∗ p<0.01, ∗∗ p<0.05, ∗ p<0.1
Standard errors are in parentheses.
Demographic controls include variables for employment industry, race, and gender.
4.5 Self Employment
One of the largest programs the DRA provides is to promote and develop entrepreneur-
ship (Masingill (2016)). To explore this, we use rate of change of the Census Bureau’s
Nonemployer Statistics. While this is only a proxy for entrepreneurship, it covers most
of the self-employment and new businesses in the region, which is a worthy goal in it-
self. There is also a substantial amount of evidence supporting the benefits self employ-
ment can have (i.e. Rupasingha and Goetz (2013)). The regression results are reported
in Table 8.
In the OLS model, the point estimates are actually slightly negative and statis-
tically significant. However, the 2SLS results results show the positive and significant
results, suggesting favorable DRA effects. In column 7, for instance, there is a 2.22
percentage point increase in the number of new nonemployers being formed over the
matched counties. All of the 2SLS results show similar point estimates, with the ex-
ception of those in column 8. This is quite notable given the national rate of nonem-
ployer increase over the same time period, averaged 1.55%. These results suggest that
the DRA is meeting its entrepreneurship goals. The counties are experiencing a boom
in new small firms over their matched counties, consistent with success in the Delta En-
trepreneurship Network.
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Table 8: Nonemployer
OLS 2SLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Treatment 0.0135∗∗∗ 0.0110∗∗∗ 0.00823∗∗∗ -0.0465∗∗∗ -0.0424∗∗∗ -0.0192∗ -0.0928∗∗∗
(0.00222) (0.00205) (0.00213) (0.0134) (0.0122) (0.0105) (0.0319)
Post 2002 0.0122∗∗∗ -0.00127 -0.00573∗ -0.0289∗∗∗ -0.0196∗∗ -0.0300∗∗∗ -0.0218∗∗∗ -0.0396∗∗∗
(0.00192) (0.00338) (0.00343) (0.00495) (0.00771) (0.00797) (0.00724) (0.00769)
Treat*Post -0.00926∗∗∗ -0.00851∗∗∗ -0.00661∗∗∗ -0.00854∗∗∗ 0.0540∗∗∗ 0.0425∗∗∗ 0.0222∗ 0.00856
(0.00246) (0.00227) (0.00226) (0.00236) (0.0152) (0.0137) (0.0121) (0.00971)
Observations 8968 8968 8968 8968 8968 8968 8968 8968
R2 0.0793 0.220 0.237 0.201 0.00178 0.161 0.221 0.988
Demographic Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes
State Fixed Effects No No Yes No No No Yes No
County Fixed Effects No No No Yes No No No Yes
∗∗∗ p<0.01, ∗∗ p<0.05, ∗ p<0.1
Standard errors are in parentheses.
Demographic controls include variables for employment industry, race, and gender.
Table 9: Net Migration
OLS 2SLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Treatment 0.000106 0.000330 0.000309 -0.0000806 -0.00105 -0.000772 0.0322∗∗∗
(0.000303) (0.000279) (0.000282) (0.00277) (0.00248) (0.00213) (0.00415)
Post 2002 0.0000902 0.00371∗∗∗ 0.00357∗∗∗ 0.00322∗∗∗ 0.000867 0.00360∗∗∗ 0.00362∗∗∗ 0.00483∗∗∗
(0.000237) (0.000346) (0.000349) (0.000446) (0.00146) (0.00134) (0.00120) (0.00101)
Treat*Post -0.000271 -0.000396 -0.000533∗ -0.000307 -0.00202 -0.000538 -0.00114 -0.00301∗
(0.000320) (0.000293) (0.000290) (0.000271) (0.00297) (0.00266) (0.00231) (0.00156)
Observations 8024 8024 8024 8024 8024 8024 8024 8024
R2 0.824 0.833 0.843 0.819 0.824 0.833 0.843 0.797
Demographic Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes
State Fixed Effects No No Yes No No No Yes No
County Fixed Effects No No No Yes No No No Yes
∗∗∗ p<0.01, ∗∗ p<0.05, ∗ p<0.1
Standard errors are in parentheses.
Demographic controls include variables for employment industry, race, and gender.
4.6 Net Migration
The previous results generally show positive economic effects. There are positive gains
in income, decreases in unemployment and poverty, and generally positive effects on
business start-ups. One possible reason for this is an influx of migrants, especially high-
skill migrants. For example, programs like Delta Doctors aim to attract high-skill health-
care workers into the DRA to address current shortages. Likewise, we may expect in-
ward net migration if the DRA generally increases employment opportunities.
Table 9 reports corresponding results using annual net migration as a percentage
of total county population from 2000 to 2015 as the dependent variable. Table’s 9 re-
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sults suggest weakly negative effects from the DRA’s efforts. That is the point esti-
mates are negative, but only in the OLS models with state and year fixed effects (col-
umn 3) and the IV results with county fixed effects (column 8) are statistically signifi-
cant. Overall, it is only possible to say that the DRA was not increasing net migration
(though it may have been negative), which may be desired to ensure that the original
low-income residents are the ones benefiting from DRA policy. A typical positive crite-
ria of place-based policy is imperfect labor force mobility (Bartik (1991), Partridge and
Rickman (2015a, 2015b). To be sure, it is still possible that high-skilled migrants are
in-migrating on net, but this overwhelmed by net migration of low-skilled workers.
4.7 DRA Dynamic Effects Over Time
A possible weakness is that the previous models assume that the DRA’s treatment ef-
fect begins immediately and remains unchanged thereafter. Possibly, a more likely dy-
namic pattern, is that the DRA’s treatment effect initially rises as it begins to oper-
ate and then levels off over time because it takes time for the DRA to affect outcomes.
Thus, we explored how the DRA’s treatment effects varied over time. Our regression
model is the exact same as Equations 1 -3) from Section 3.3, however Treatment ∗Post
was replaced by Treatment ∗ Y ear in which Y ear is a dummy variable for each year
from 2002 onwards. The IV correction is applied for each Treatment ∗ Y ear variable.
The results are reported in Appendix 2 and only show one OLS and 2SLS regression
with demographic controls and state and year fixed effects.
First, we consider the median income change models. Both OLS and IV regres-
sion results show nearly identical results in terms of magnitude and significance. In the
OLS result, it takes until 2006 for positive growth to occur; however, sustained posi-
tive effects over the matched counties are not noticeable until 2009. Post 2009, there is
a consistent higher level of income hovering around 3%. The 2SLS results show posi-
tive sustained growth starting in 2007 instead of 2009 with a larger magnitude (some-
where normally between 3 and 4%).These results suggest that by assuming an average
treatment effect that does not vary time, our previous median household income results
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appear to underestimated the contemporaneous effects of the DRA after its influence
more strongly took hold.
The poverty trend results are less unclear. The total poverty results show no clear
or statistically significant impact. The results for child poverty are a bit more complex.
The OLS results provide some evidence of a growing impact on child poverty, with a
decrease at about 1.5%. The 2SLS results paint a less clear picture with little trend.
There is no consistent change in child poverty rate. Despite this, the point estimates
are mostly negative. This would suggest there is some negative trend on poverty.
The OLS unemployment results suggest the DRA’s decreasing effects do not kick
in until 2006. The IV results indicate less of clear trend, though during the 2009-2010
period, the effects are negative and stastically significant. This provides evidence that
during the Great Recession and its immediate aftermath, the DRA provided needed
help in reducing unemployment.
Finally, both the IV and OLS net migration results continue to show no consistent
DRA pattern over time.
5 Robustness Checks
This section presents some robustness checks of the results in Section 4.
5.1 ARC Included
As noted above, we did not include the ARC counties as possible candidates in the
pool of possible match counties, though this came at the cost of losing many counties
that would have provided closer matches, providing a better counterfactual. They also
increase the number of matched counties to 90 from 33 in the counterfactual. Gener-
ally, we would expect that if the much better funded and more established ARC was
successful in improving its counties’ outcomes, that would reduce the estimated effects
of the DRA. The corresponding results are available upon request. Perhaps surpris-
ingly, most of the conclusions do not tangibly change. All estimates remain the same
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sign and generally the same statistical significance, only the point estimates slightly
change, however they continue to support a general theme that the DRA has modest
postive effects.
5.2 Different Treatment Year
As described above, the DRA was became law in 2000, but did not become operational
until 2002. If there were any tangible anticipation effects, it would make sense to start
the treatment effects in 2000. As a result, we assess the robustness of the results using
2000 as the beginning of the DRA’s treatment. Net-migration results are not reported
as there would be no pretreatment years due to data availability.
The results from these regressions are available upon request. There are some dif-
ferences from using 2002 as treatment compared to 2000. First, median income has
considerably smaller impacts. Median income goes up by about 3% compared to about
8% before. Next, unemployment rate estimates show smaller impacts, dropping by
.612 percentage points compared to 1.25. Finally, poverty rate shows no significant im-
pacts. One reason for the smaller results could reflect from the negative selection of the
DRA counties—i.e., they were doing worse than their matched counterparts prior to
the DRA.
5.3 Adjusting the Matching Algorithm
Another possible concern is our use of one-to-one matching with replacement for the
propensity score matched counties. This results in only 33 counties being used when
matched. To address this, we change the matching algorithm by using nearest neighbor
matching with replacement and three matches. This is a difference from one-to-one by
the algorithm finds three untreated counties that matches closest on observable charac-
teristics instead of one. This method is fairly common in the literature and should add
more control counties to compare against. Updated summary statistics and the corre-
sponding regression results are available upon request.
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The results suggest that three nearest-neighbor matching seems inferior in iden-
tifying close matches to the treatment counties. Before treatment begins, the near-
est neighbor matches have higher incomes, lower poverty rates, and lower unemploy-
ment. The outcome variable means for the matched counties are farther from the DRA
county means than when one-to-one matching is used. Thus even though the nearest
neighbor has a larger sample of control counties (61 compared to 33), it may come at
the cost of accurate controls.
Turning to these regression results, the main results are fairly robust. For me-
dian income, the results from the three nearest neighbor matches seem to be of slightly
smaller magnitude than the base results, whereas statistical significance is also little
changed. These results are consistent across the other economic measures in terms of
magnitude of the coefficients and their statistical significance.
6 Conclusion
Given the growing interest in place-base policies, this paper assesses a relatively small
policy intervention, the Delta Regional Authority. We ask whether quite small place-
based programs like the DRA have any measurable efforts and in turn, whether they
are even worth the effort beyond a political desire to appear to be trying something.
This paper explores the economic impact of the DRA on its member counties, repre-
senting the first paper to examine its longer-run outcomes. We use the Lower Missis-
sippi Watershed as a unique instrumental variable to correct for selection bias into the
DRA. Using this correction along with propensity score matching, we assess the effec-
tiveness of the DRA.
Using both OLS and IV difference in difference estimation, we find a number of
significant economic benefit to the DRA. There are positive benefits to unemployment
and income growth and it appears to decrease child poverty. However, it had no mea-
surable impact on migration. Overall the program increases annual median household
income by $1051.38 assuming its benefits are uniform across the income distribution.
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Given its annual budget is quiet small ($25.6 million in FY 2018), the program appears
to easily pass cost-benefit analysis. One possible reason for its relative success is that
the relative small nature of the DRA allows it to pick only the most worthy initiatives
with the highest rate of return. While at the margin, this does suggest that expanding
the DRA would be beneficial, it is not guaranteed if the program was greatly expanded,
whether we would continue to observe such a high payoff. Indeed this federal-state
commission can bring all the relative federal, state, and local governments and stake
holders together to cooperate. Nonetheless, the DRA appears to be benefiting one of
the poorest regions in the country at very little cost.
There is much work that can be done to further research in this field. First, us-
ing synthetic control method has the potential to create a better counterfactual with
a more varied donor pool. In this study, there were very few counties that matched to
the treated counties. Using synthetic control method, the mix of a number of coun-
ties would allow a researcher to exploit additional variation amongst the control and
treated groups. We also did not consider many potential economic indicators that should
be explored, including but not limited to health outcomes (given the DRA’s health-
care focus) and happiness indicators. Another example is conducting a more detailed
sectoral analysis of the DRA’s effects to assess which industries are being helped or
harmed by its programming.
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Appendix 1: Parallel Trend Graphs
Figure 2: Income Trends
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Figure 3: Poverty Trends
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Figure 4: Child Poverty Trends
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Figure 5: Unemployment Trends
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Figure 6: Nonemployer
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Figure 7: Net Migration
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Appendix 2: DRA Dynamic Effects Over Time Ta-
bles
Table 10: Median Household Income
OLS 2SLS
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Treatment -0.00476 0.155∗∗∗ -0.285∗∗∗
(0.00392) (0.0132) (0.0219)
Treatment*2002 0.0110 0.000632 -0.118∗∗∗ 0.000632
(0.00928) (0.00365) (0.0143) (0.00365)
Treatment*2003 0.00838 0.0102∗∗∗ -0.121∗∗∗ 0.0102∗∗∗
(0.00926) (0.00364) (0.0143) (0.00364)
Treatment*2004 0.00689 0.00657∗ -0.123∗∗∗ 0.00657∗
(0.00925) (0.00363) (0.0143) (0.00363)
Treatment*2005 0.0119 0.0114∗∗∗ -0.119∗∗∗ 0.0114∗∗∗
(0.00926) (0.00365) (0.0143) (0.00365)
Treatment*2006 0.0239∗∗∗ 0.0234∗∗∗ -0.106∗∗∗ 0.0234∗∗∗
(0.00926) (0.00365) (0.0143) (0.00365)
Treatment*2007 0.00864 0.00233 -0.123∗∗∗ 0.00233
(0.00928) (0.00365) (0.0144) (0.00365)
Treatment*2008 0.00521 -0.00341 -0.127∗∗∗ -0.00341
(0.00930) (0.00367) (0.0145) (0.00367)
Treatment*2009 0.0326∗∗∗ 0.0233∗∗∗ -0.1000∗∗∗ 0.0233∗∗∗
(0.00931) (0.00367) (0.0145) (0.00367)
Treatment*2010 0.0304∗∗∗ 0.0253∗∗∗ -0.103∗∗∗ 0.0253∗∗∗
(0.00930) (0.00367) (0.0145) (0.00367)
Treatment*2011 0.0237∗∗ 0.0140∗∗∗ -0.110∗∗∗ 0.0140∗∗∗
(0.00931) (0.00367) (0.0145) (0.00367)
Treatment*2012 0.0281∗∗∗ 0.0225∗∗∗ -0.104∗∗∗ 0.0225∗∗∗
(0.00930) (0.00367) (0.0144) (0.00367)
Treatment*2013 0.0344∗∗∗ 0.0229∗∗∗ -0.0989∗∗∗ 0.0229∗∗∗
(0.00931) (0.00367) (0.0145) (0.00367)
Treatment*2014 0.0159∗ 0.00599 -0.118∗∗∗ 0.00599
(0.00930) (0.00367) (0.0145) (0.00367)
Treatment*2015 0.0253∗∗∗ 0.0207∗∗∗ -0.108∗∗∗ 0.0207∗∗∗
(0.00931) (0.00367) (0.0145) (0.00367)
Observations 9800 9800 9800 9800
2 0.770 0.906 0.730 0.966
Demographic Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
State Fixed Effects Yes No Yes No
County Fixed Effects No Yes No Yes
∗∗∗ p<0.01, ∗∗ p<0.05, ∗ p<0.1
Standard errors are in parentheses.
Demographic controls include variables for employment industry, race, and gender.
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Table 11: Percent of People in Poverty
OLS 2SLS
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Treatment 0.00132 -0.0209∗∗∗ 0.0748∗∗∗
(0.00127) (0.00401) (0.00954)
Treatment*2002 -0.00559∗ -0.00175 0.0124∗∗∗ -0.00175
(0.00300) (0.00159) (0.00433) (0.00159)
Treatment*2003 -0.00672∗∗ -0.00558∗∗∗ 0.0113∗∗∗ -0.00558∗∗∗
(0.00299) (0.00159) (0.00433) (0.00159)
Treatment*2004 -0.00474 -0.00367∗∗ 0.0134∗∗∗ -0.00367∗∗
(0.00299) (0.00159) (0.00434) (0.00159)
Treatment*2005 0.00201 0.00383∗∗ 0.0202∗∗∗ 0.00383∗∗
(0.00300) (0.00159) (0.00435) (0.00159)
Treatment*2006 -0.00741∗∗ -0.00534∗∗∗ 0.0107∗∗ -0.00534∗∗∗
(0.00300) (0.00159) (0.00434) (0.00159)
Treatment*2007 -0.00419 -0.00157 0.0141∗∗∗ -0.00157
(0.00300) (0.00159) (0.00436) (0.00159)
Treatment*2008 -0.00478 -0.00236 0.0137∗∗∗ -0.00236
(0.00301) (0.00160) (0.00439) (0.00160)
Treatment*2009 -0.0111∗∗∗ -0.00961∗∗∗ 0.00738∗ -0.00961∗∗∗
(0.00301) (0.00160) (0.00439) (0.00160)
Treatment*2010 -0.0179∗∗∗ -0.0171∗∗∗ 0.000680 -0.0171∗∗∗
(0.00301) (0.00160) (0.00440) (0.00160)
Treatment*2011 -0.00832∗∗∗ -0.00607∗∗∗ 0.0103∗∗ -0.00607∗∗∗
(0.00301) (0.00160) (0.00441) (0.00160)
Treatment*2012 -0.00496∗ -0.00339∗∗ 0.0135∗∗∗ -0.00339∗∗
(0.00301) (0.00160) (0.00439) (0.00160)
Treatment*2013 -0.0105∗∗∗ -0.00733∗∗∗ 0.00807∗ -0.00733∗∗∗
(0.00301) (0.00160) (0.00441) (0.00160)
Treatment*2014 -0.00780∗∗∗ -0.00528∗∗∗ 0.0108∗∗ -0.00528∗∗∗
(0.00301) (0.00160) (0.00441) (0.00160)
Treatment*2015 -0.00564∗ -0.00417∗∗∗ 0.0129∗∗∗ -0.00417∗∗∗
(0.00301) (0.00160) (0.00441) (0.00160)
Observations 9800 9800 9800 9800
R2 0.736 0.635 0.728 0.929
Demographic Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
State Fixed Effects Yes No Yes No
County Fixed Effects No Yes No Yes
∗∗∗ p<0.01, ∗∗ p<0.05, ∗ p<0.1
Standard errors are in parentheses.
Demographic controls include variables for employment industry, race, and gender.
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Table 12: Percent of Children in Poverty
OLS 2SLS
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Treatment 0.00190 -0.0570∗∗∗ 0.0590∗∗∗
(0.00180) (0.00591) (0.0150)
Treatment*2002 -0.00611 -0.000735 0.0416∗∗∗ -0.000735
(0.00427) (0.00250) (0.00639) (0.00250)
Treatment*2003 -0.00638 -0.00534∗∗ 0.0415∗∗∗ -0.00534∗∗
(0.00426) (0.00250) (0.00639) (0.00250)
Treatment*2004 -0.0106∗∗ -0.00945∗∗∗ 0.0374∗∗∗ -0.00945∗∗∗
(0.00425) (0.00249) (0.00639) (0.00249)
Treatment*2005 0.00335 0.00486∗ 0.0516∗∗∗ 0.00486∗
(0.00426) (0.00250) (0.00642) (0.00250)
Treatment*2006 -0.00188 -0.000485 0.0462∗∗∗ -0.000485
(0.00426) (0.00250) (0.00641) (0.00250)
Treatment*2007 -0.00196 0.00148 0.0464∗∗∗ 0.00148
(0.00427) (0.00251) (0.00643) (0.00251)
Treatment*2008 -0.00859∗∗ -0.00519∗∗ 0.0403∗∗∗ -0.00519∗∗
(0.00428) (0.00252) (0.00647) (0.00252)
Treatment*2009 -0.0167∗∗∗ -0.0135∗∗∗ 0.0322∗∗∗ -0.0135∗∗∗
(0.00428) (0.00252) (0.00648) (0.00252)
Treatment*2010 -0.0146∗∗∗ -0.0122∗∗∗ 0.0345∗∗∗ -0.0122∗∗∗
(0.00428) (0.00252) (0.00649) (0.00252)
Treatment*2011 -0.0179∗∗∗ -0.0133∗∗∗ 0.0314∗∗∗ -0.0133∗∗∗
(0.00428) (0.00252) (0.00650) (0.00252)
Treatment*2012 -0.00488 -0.00120 0.0439∗∗∗ -0.00120
(0.00428) (0.00252) (0.00647) (0.00252)
Treatment*2013 -0.0209∗∗∗ -0.0155∗∗∗ 0.0283∗∗∗ -0.0155∗∗∗
(0.00428) (0.00252) (0.00650) (0.00252)
Treatment*2014 -0.0166∗∗∗ -0.0128∗∗∗ 0.0327∗∗∗ -0.0128∗∗∗
(0.00428) (0.00252) (0.00651) (0.00252)
Treatment*2015 -0.00808∗ -0.00620∗∗ 0.0411∗∗∗ -0.00620∗∗
(0.00428) (0.00252) (0.00650) (0.00252)
Observations 9800 9800 9800 9800
R2 0.716 0.637 0.685 0.906
Demographic Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
State Fixed Effects Yes No Yes No
County Fixed Effects No Yes No Yes
∗∗∗ p<0.01, ∗∗ p<0.05, ∗ p<0.1
Standard errors are in parentheses.
Demographic controls include variables for employment industry, race, and gender.
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Table 13: Unemployment Rate
OLS 2SLS
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Treatment 0.00408∗∗∗ -0.00613∗∗∗ 0.0236∗∗∗
(0.000664) (0.00209) (0.00715)
Treatment*2002 -0.00712∗∗∗ -0.00634∗∗∗ 0.00115 -0.00634∗∗∗
(0.00157) (0.00119) (0.00226) (0.00119)
Treatment*2003 -0.000516 0.0000518 0.00778∗∗∗ 0.0000518
(0.00157) (0.00119) (0.00226) (0.00119)
Treatment*2004 0.000129 0.00100 0.00844∗∗∗ 0.00100
(0.00157) (0.00119) (0.00226) (0.00119)
Treatment*2005 -0.00261∗ -0.001000 0.00575∗∗ -0.001000
(0.00157) (0.00119) (0.00227) (0.00119)
Treatment*2006 -0.00867∗∗∗ -0.00710∗∗∗ -0.000337 -0.00710∗∗∗
(0.00157) (0.00119) (0.00227) (0.00119)
Treatment*2007 -0.0172∗∗∗ -0.0147∗∗∗ -0.00880∗∗∗ -0.0147∗∗∗
(0.00157) (0.00119) (0.00228) (0.00119)
Treatment*2008 -0.00948∗∗∗ -0.00652∗∗∗ -0.00101 -0.00652∗∗∗
(0.00158) (0.00120) (0.00229) (0.00120)
Treatment*2009 -0.0130∗∗∗ -0.00932∗∗∗ -0.00455∗∗ -0.00932∗∗∗
(0.00158) (0.00120) (0.00229) (0.00120)
Treatment*2010 -0.0105∗∗∗ -0.00659∗∗∗ -0.00196 -0.00659∗∗∗
(0.00158) (0.00120) (0.00230) (0.00120)
Treatment*2011 -0.00701∗∗∗ -0.00267∗∗ 0.00154 -0.00267∗∗
(0.00158) (0.00120) (0.00230) (0.00120)
Treatment*2012 -0.00806∗∗∗ -0.00401∗∗∗ 0.000400 -0.00401∗∗∗
(0.00158) (0.00120) (0.00229) (0.00120)
Treatment*2013 -0.00971∗∗∗ -0.00591∗∗∗ -0.00118 -0.00591∗∗∗
(0.00158) (0.00120) (0.00230) (0.00120)
Treatment*2014 -0.00661∗∗∗ -0.00320∗∗∗ 0.00195 -0.00320∗∗∗
(0.00158) (0.00120) (0.00230) (0.00120)
Treatment*2015 -0.000941 0.00148 0.00759∗∗∗ 0.00148
(0.00158) (0.00120) (0.00230) (0.00120)
Observations 9800 9800 9800 9800
R2 0.694 0.692 0.686 0.831
Demographic Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
State Fixed Effects Yes No Yes No
County Fixed Effects No Yes No Yes
∗∗∗ p<0.01, ∗∗ p<0.05, ∗ p<0.1
Standard errors are in parentheses.
Demographic controls include variables for employment industry, race, and gender.
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Table 14: Nonemployer
OLS 2SLS
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Treatment 0.00514∗∗∗ -0.00366 -0.0545∗
(0.00199) (0.00649) (0.0290)
Treatment*2002 -0.0242∗∗∗ -0.0246∗∗∗ -0.0169∗∗ -0.0246∗∗∗
(0.00443) (0.00444) (0.00677) (0.00444)
Treatment*2003 0.00657 0.00738∗ 0.0139∗∗ 0.00738∗
(0.00442) (0.00442) (0.00677) (0.00442)
Treatment*2004 0.000246 -0.000325 0.00757 -0.000325
(0.00441) (0.00442) (0.00678) (0.00442)
Treatment*2005 0.00872∗∗ 0.00841∗ 0.0161∗∗ 0.00841∗
(0.00442) (0.00444) (0.00680) (0.00444)
Treatment*2006 -0.00664 -0.00691 0.000705 -0.00691
(0.00442) (0.00444) (0.00679) (0.00444)
Treatment*2007 0.00242 0.00158 0.00981 0.00158
(0.00443) (0.00445) (0.00682) (0.00445)
Treatment*2008 -0.00456 -0.00535 0.00288 -0.00535
(0.00444) (0.00446) (0.00686) (0.00446)
Treatment*2009 0.00997∗∗ 0.00812∗ 0.0174∗∗ 0.00812∗
(0.00444) (0.00446) (0.00686) (0.00446)
Treatment*2010 -0.0234∗∗∗ -0.0242∗∗∗ -0.0160∗∗ -0.0242∗∗∗
(0.00444) (0.00446) (0.00688) (0.00446)
Treatment*2011 -0.00203 -0.00352 0.00547 -0.00352
(0.00444) (0.00447) (0.00689) (0.00447)
Treatment*2012 -0.0330∗∗∗ -0.0339∗∗∗ -0.0256∗∗∗ -0.0339∗∗∗
(0.00444) (0.00446) (0.00685) (0.00446)
Treatment*2013 -0.0125∗∗∗ -0.0131∗∗∗ -0.00497 -0.0131∗∗∗
(0.00444) (0.00446) (0.00688) (0.00446)
Treatment*2014 -0.0207∗∗∗ -0.0208∗∗∗ -0.0132∗ -0.0208∗∗∗
(0.00444) (0.00446) (0.00689) (0.00446)
Treatment*2015 0.00403 0.00391 0.0115∗ 0.00391
(0.00444) (0.00446) (0.00687) (0.00446)
Observations 9310 9310 9310 9310
R2 0.203 0.165 0.201 0.236
Demographic Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
State Fixed Effects Yes No Yes No
County Fixed Effects No Yes No Yes
∗∗∗ p<0.01, ∗∗ p<0.05, ∗ p<0.1
Standard errors are in parentheses.
Demographic controls include variables for employment industry, race, and gender.
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Table 15: Net Migration
OLS 2SLS
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Treatment -0.000107 -0.00260∗∗∗ 0.00917∗∗∗
(0.000230) (0.000867) (0.00302)
Treatment*2002 -0.000501 -0.000632 0.00168∗∗ -0.000632
(0.000432) (0.000385) (0.000851) (0.000385)
Treatment*2003 0.00183∗∗∗ 0.00145∗∗∗ 0.00401∗∗∗ 0.00145∗∗∗
(0.000431) (0.000383) (0.000851) (0.000383)
Treatment*2004 -0.000127 -0.000181 0.00206∗∗ -0.000181
(0.000430) (0.000383) (0.000853) (0.000383)
Treatment*2005 0.000793∗ 0.000411 0.00299∗∗∗ 0.000411
(0.000431) (0.000385) (0.000855) (0.000385)
Treatment*2006 0.000437 0.0000263 0.00263∗∗∗ 0.0000263
(0.000431) (0.000386) (0.000854) (0.000386)
Treatment*2007 0.000222 -0.00000946 0.00243∗∗∗ -0.00000946
(0.000432) (0.000386) (0.000857) (0.000386)
Treatment*2008 0.000508 0.000501 0.00272∗∗∗ 0.000501
(0.000433) (0.000387) (0.000861) (0.000387)
Treatment*2009 -0.000149 0.000117 0.00206∗∗ 0.000117
(0.000433) (0.000387) (0.000860) (0.000387)
Treatment*2010 -0.00108∗∗ -0.000910∗∗ 0.00114 -0.000910∗∗
(0.000432) (0.000386) (0.000862) (0.000386)
Treatment*2011 0.000586 0.000857∗∗ 0.00281∗∗∗ 0.000857∗∗
(0.000433) (0.000387) (0.000863) (0.000387)
Treatment*2012 0.000243 0.000415 0.00245∗∗∗ 0.000415
(0.000432) (0.000387) (0.000860) (0.000387)
Treatment*2013 -0.000231 0.0000368 0.00198∗∗ 0.0000368
(0.000432) (0.000386) (0.000860) (0.000386)
Treatment*2014 0.000382 0.000577 0.00260∗∗∗ 0.000577
(0.000432) (0.000386) (0.000860) (0.000386)
Treatment*2015 0.000550 0.000680∗ 0.00276∗∗∗ 0.000680∗
(0.000432) (0.000386) (0.000858) (0.000386)
Observations 8330 8330 8330 8330
R2 0.834 0.796 0.832 0.875
Demographic Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
State Fixed Effects Yes No Yes No
County Fixed Effects No Yes No Yes
∗∗∗ p<0.01, ∗∗ p<0.05, ∗ p<0.1
Standard errors are in parentheses.
Demographic controls include variables for employment industry, race, and gender.
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